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JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND THE INNER SELF.

By G. Edward White. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pp. ix,
628. $37.50.
G. Edward White1 has embraced a task of monumental proportions. A biography concentrating on either the life or the work of
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. must be complex and thorough; one
exploring the interaction between the two proinises to be herculean. Yet White emerges victorious in the end, letting his extensive
research, lucid prose, and keen insights guide the reader effortlessly
through the 490-page biography.
White begins his journey with an autobiographical statement
Holmes wrote as a senior at Harvard College (p. 7). The statement
frames the opening chapter, "Heritage," as it introduces the subjects upon which White will initially focus: Holmes's father,
mother, ancestors, experience at Harvard College, and early literary endeavors (pp. 7-8). The author first discusses Holmes's complex relationship with his father, Dr. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr. author of the Autocrat essays,2 poet, and Harvard Medical School
professor (pp. 9-11). Dr. Holmes was "one of the last true generalists ... a prime mover in an astonishing range of fields: in medicine,
psychology, and theology, as well as in lecturing and literature."3
White carefully delineates various aspects of the father-son relationship, noting both parties' competitiveness, egotism, and concealed affection for each other (pp. 11-14). The author asserts that
Holmes adopted his father's idea of a "life plan," but that his selfpreoccupation, in contrast to his father's vivaciousness, channelled
his achievements into one field - the law.4 Next comes Amelia
1. University Professor and John B. Minor Professor of Law and History, University of
Virginia.
2. These immensely popular essays, which appeared in the Atlantic Monthly, described an
"autocrat" narrator holding forth in a "mythical rooming house" on a wide variety of subjects, including religion, the art of conversation, literary societies, and vulgarisms in speech.
P. 9.

3. Peter Gibian, Opening and Closing the Conversation: Style and Stance from Holmes
Senior to Holmes Junior, in THE LEGACY OF OUVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 187 (Robert W.
Gordon ed., 1992).
4. White may overemphasize the role of personality in Holmes's "narrowing and refining
his field of study." P. 13. The younger Holmes sketched a life plan based upon not only his
"self-preoccupation and singlemindedness" (p. 14), but also his desire to distance himself
from his father, whose achievements - at least according to his son - paled in comparison
with his popularity:
Not having been blessed (or cursed) with his father's exuberant versatility the temptation to scatter his talents was probably less compelling, but the son's literary, philosophical, and artistic interests were certainly of sufficient in~ensity to have made diffusion of
his energy a real possibility had not the example of his father given warning of the damage which may result from that diffusion.
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Holmes, the devoted mother trapped in the constraints of the preVictorian era (pp. 14-17). White notes that she "passionately
grasped" opportunities for achievement within the domestic sphere
and directed her energies "almost exclusively toward the comfort of
her husband and children."5 The ancestors follow, in particular, the
grandfathers - Judge Charles Jackson, member of the mercantile
community and justice on the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, and the Reverend Abiel Holmes, minister and historian (pp.
17-19) - each illustrating distinct aspects of Holmes's secular and
religious heritage.
After tracing Holmes's ancestral lineage, White turns to early
environmental influences on Holmes: the provincial yet intellectual
Brahmin Boston (pp. 20-24) and Harvard College (pp. 25-32).
Harvard's classes and professors did not have a significant influence
on Holmes.6 Indeed, the college's criteria for ranking students belied its rigid atmosphere: "Points were assigned for student
achievements and reduced for disciplinary violations, so that intellectual performances and what the faculty saw as moral performances were regarded as equivalents" (p. 25). Instead, Harvard
introduced Holmes to what would become lifelong activities: avid
reading, writing, and the cultivation of friendships and intimacies
(pp. 26-27). After a discussion of the motivation Holmes received
from the art critic John Ruskin and the transcendentalist sage
Ralph Waldo Emerson - both of whom provided Holmes with a
historicist perspective7 - White closes the chapter by highlighting
the tension between "the cumulative weight" of Holmes's ancestral
heritage and Holmes's current self, as revealed through his literary
achievements, membership in social clubs, and participation in the
Civil War (p. 47). The author remarks that Holmes even attempted
to distance himself from his ancestors' "natural bent" to literature
(pp. 47-48), even though the literary style would later be omnipresent in his judicial opinions and legal writings.
MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, JUSTICE OUVER WENDELL HOLMES: THE SHAPING YEARS 18411870 at 20-21 (1957) [hereinafter HoWE, SHAPING YEARS].
5. Pp. 15-16. Amelia Holmes succeeded in this endeavor: "It was her artistry that balanced the demands and desires of each family member, that soothed the tensions between
the generations and the rivalries among the young, that provided the cement that held the
[Holmes family] together." LlvA BA~ THE JUSTICE FROM BEACON Hu.!.: THE LIFE AND
TIMES OF OUVER WENDELL HOLMES 65 (1991). Balcer also describes Holmes's siblings:
Amelia Jackson Holmes, a "chatterbox," and Edward Jackson ("Ned"} Holmes, a "practical
joker." Id. Oliver Wendell Holmes "seems only rarely to have noticed [his siblings] in his
preoccupation with trying to escape Dr. Holmes's shadow •••. " Id.; see also p. 495 n.61
(noting that Holmes "does not seem to have been particularly close to either sibling").
6. See HoWE, SHAPING YEARS, supra note 4, at 78.
7. Pp. 34-39. Such perspective "defined the course of societal change as continuous and
inevitable, so that the 'past' was necessarily different from the 'present.' " P. 34.
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Chapter 1\vo - "The Civil War" - emphasizes an experience
that had a profound impact on Holmes's view of the world. The
war affected Holmes not only in the brute force of its imagery and
its revelation of the insignificance of the individual in the face of
collective and historical forces, 8 but also in providing a contrast
with the conversational - and often inconclusive - milieu of his
father. 9
White imposes on the Civil War chapter a tripartite structure
that extracts and situates Holmes's post hoc memorialization of the
war in his professional life. The initial section of ~e chapter offers
a chronology of Holmes's wartime experience, tracing his involvement - including the battles he saw and his injuries - between his
enlistment in August 1861 and his departure from the war in July
1864 (pp. 50-65). The second part highlights Holmes's contemporaneous reactions to his experience. White sketches Holmes's increasing disenchantment with war and his evolving conception of
loyalty: first to a cause, then to the regiment, and finally to himself. to It is this evolution, with its accompanying feelings of guilt,11
for which Holmes sought to make amends in his recollections of the
war in subsequent years. Such recollections constitute the subject
of the third part of the chapter, in which White depicts an "official"
bloodless and duty-laden conception of the war replacing Holmes's
specific memories of the atrocities.12 Unable to relinquish the warlike spirit, Holmes sought to draw analogies between his judicial
work and the war. In addressing a fiftieth reunion of the Harvard
8. The impact of the war on Holmes's life philosophy is revealed by statements such as:
"[O]ur only but wholly adequate significance is as parts of the unimaginable whole." Oliver
Wendell Holmes Jr., "Parts of the Unimaginable Whole" Address (June 28, 1911), reprinted
in MAx LERNER, THE MIND AND FAlTII OF JusnCE HOLMES 27 (1943); "[Heroism involves]
the ability to become a cog in a large, disciplined machine, to accept one's place as a single
soldier in the unknowable movements of a huge army." Gibian, supra note 3, at 206; "No
society has ever admitted that it could not sacrifice individual welfare to its own existence."
OUVER WENDELL HoLMES, JR., THE CoMMoN LAw 43 (1881). For Holmes, the insignificance of the individual in the face of the larger entity would ultimately evolve into an insignificance in the expanse of the universe and passage of time.
9. See Gibian, supra note 3, at 196 ("In the endless give-and-take of Holmes Senior's
conversations, no assertion is ever final . • • . [T]his chaos ..• might ••• stand as a troubling
picture not only of a mind divided or a boardinghouse divided but of a nation divided.").
10. Pp. 65-72. Holmes demonstrated the latter loyalty in his decision not to reenlist after
the expiration of his three-year term. He "had had enough of war •••• [He] desire[d] to
preserve himself rather than ... appear chivalric and honorable." Pp. 71-72.
11. Holmes's feelings of guilt stemmed from leaving the battlefield before dying or becoming a general: "All his life he worried that he had not met his obligation; if he had to do
it again, he told friends, he would have stayed through the war." Hiller B. Zobel, The Three
Civil Wars of Oliver Wendell Holmes: Notes for an Odyssey (Part Ill), BOSTON B.J., Feb.
1983, at 24.
12. Pp. 72-86. Such a conception mirrors Holmes's increased detachment from the world
around him; the Civil War planted in Holmes "[t]he deadening of sympathetic feelings, the
Olympian aloofness, the spectator view ••. the belief in heroic action, the disbelief in causes
.•.." Saul Touster, In Search of Holmes from Within, 18 VAND. L. REv. 457, 470 (1965).
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Class of 1861, for example, Holmes referred to the work of soldiers
as "hammer[ing] out as compact and solid a piece of work as one
can."13 Although White acknowledges that, on one level, the analogy between war and judging could be viewed as "nonsensical," he
recognizes that Holm.es sought to replicate in his judicial pursuits
the passions he experienced in war, and to "reassure himself that he
was still participating in the fight ... that he could continue to claim
the privilege of having been touched with fire" (p. 86).
White appropriately locates an origin of Holmes's judicial passion in his Civil War background. Yet he fails to explore three
other origins of Holmes's motivation. First, Holmes's mother endowed her son with a strong ambition. As Holmes wrote, "[B]y the
temperament I get from my mother, without some feeling of accomplishment I feel as if it were time for me to die." 14 Second,
Holmes's Puritan background - the spirit that dictates that "to
take the easy way is to take the wrong way" 15 - impelled him
onward. Finally, intellectual exploration motivated Holmes; his
ambition manifested itself not in a quest for particular positions,
but in a constant test of his mental capacity.16
White continues his exploration of Holmes's nonlegal life in the
third chapter, tracing Holmes's "Friendships, Companions, and Attachments" between 1864 and 1882. After briefly discussing
Holmes's attendance at Harvard Law School - "a desultory, tedious experience" (p. 91), yet one that convinced him that the law
was to be his profession-White turns to Holmes's social acquaintances. Beginning in 1866, and continuing through 1913, Holmes
embarked on nine sojourns to Great Britain to partake of the high
13. Holmes, "Parts of the Unimaginable Whole" Address (June 28, 1911), reprinted in
LERNER, supra note 8, at 25, 27.
14. HoWE, SHAPING YEARS, supra note 4, at 280 n.h (quoting II Holmes-Laski Letters
1278 (Mark D. Howe ed., 1941)).
15. MARK DEWOLFE HoWE, JusnCE OUVER WENDELL Hot.MES: THE PROVING YEARS
1870-1882 at 282 (1963) [hereinafter HOWE, PROVING YEARS]; see also Q&A: A Conversation with Paul Freund in HARVARD GAZETIE, July 5, 1991, at 5 (Holmes's "Puritan work
ethic" is revealed through his statement that "the work never is done, although the race is
over."); HoWE, SHAPING YEARS, supra note 4, at 280 (Holmes "was always possessed by an
impelling sense of time's urgency, - a Puritan's feeling of responsibility that no moment
should be wasted."). White recognizes the Puritan influence on Holmes in, for example,
Holmes's voracious reading and his self-control (p. 23), but he does not extrapolate such
beliefs to the realms of ambition and motivation.
16. See, e.g., HoWE, SHAPING YEARS, supra note 4, at 280-81 ("I assume that your ambition, like mine, cannot be satisfied by office or anything resting in the will of others but only
by the trembling hope that you have hit the ut de poitrine." (quoting letter from Holmes to
Judge Learned Hand (Mar. 18, 1922) (Holmes Papers (on file at Harvard Law School))));
THE ESSENTIAL Hot.MES: SELECTIONS FROM THE LETrERS, SPEECHES, JUDICIAL OPINlONS,
AND OTHER WRITINGS OF OUVER WENDELL HoLMES, JR., at 29 (Richard A. Posner ed.,
1992) ("The thing I have wanted to do and want to do is to put as many new ideas into the
law as I can, to show how particular solutions involve general theory, and to do it with style."
(quoting letter from Holmes to Patrick Sheehan (Dec. 15, 1912) (Holmes Papers (on file at
Harvard Law School)))).
·
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society, culture, and conversations that life there availed (pp. 95102). He would cultivate intimate relationships on these trips, particularly one - described in Chapter Seven - with Clare
Castletown, a member of the "Ascendancy," or Anglo-Irish landowning class (pp. 230-49). Although Holmes visited Castletown
several times in his travels, it is the correspondence between them
that has generated the most attention. The pair traded letters from
1896 until 1927, often sharing their innermost thoughts. Holmes
wrote to Castletown in September 1896 that a recent letter she sent
"is what I have been longing for and is water to my thirst,"17 and
two years later, after returning from abroad, rejoiced: "Oh my dear
what joy it is to feel the inner chambers of one's soul open for the
other to walk in and out at will."1 8 Holmes wrote perhaps his most
passionate letter two weeks later, in language revealing that he had
lost control of his emotions: "I long long long for you and think
think think about you. You would be satisfied I think."19
In stark contrast to such passion stands Holmes's wife of fiftytwo years, Fanny Dixwell Holmes. Fanny was not privy to her husband's professional work, nor did she accompany him on his trips
abroad.20 In fact, she was more of a social recluse than he, in part,
perhaps, because of an attack of rheumatic fever one month after
marrying Holmes (p. 105). Although she possessed a strong wit,
effectively played the role of hostess upon the Holmeses' arrival in
Washington, D.C., and provided emotional support for her husband, she was "relegated to a distinctly bounded realm of Holmes'
existence" (p. 107). For in the end, Holmes would not let anyone
interfere with his work.
In Chapter Four, White turns to Holmes's early legal scholarship, examining such work for its own sake and not merely as a
precursor to his more famous subsequent work. The author notes
that scholarship was "the professional center of [Holmes's] life during his late twenties and thirties" (p. 112). Although such scholarship often derived from the works of others, Holmes refused to
acknowledge, and even downplayed, his predecessors' contributions.21 White traces Holmes's methodological shift from the philo17. P. 232 (quoting letter from Holmes to Clare Castletown (Sept. 5, 18%) (Holmes Papers (on file at Harvard Law School))).
18. P. 240 (quoting letter from Holmes to Clare Castletown (Sept. 5, 1898) (Holmes Papers (on file at Harvard Law School))).
19. P. 242 (quoting letter from Holmes to Clare Castletown (Sept. 16, 1898) (Holmes
Papers (on file at Harvard Law School))).
20. After accompanying her husband on two trips to England - as it turned out, her only
such trips - "it was clear ••• that she did not take the same relish in the company of English
socialites that he did." P. 102.
21. For example, Holmes adopted a theory of Henry Maine's in The Common Law, but
asserted that: "I do not think [Maine] will leave much mark on the actual structure of jurisprudence." P. 115 (quoting letter from Holmes to Frederick Pollock (Mar. 4, 1888) {I
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sophical classification of legal subjects (pp. 117-18, 122-23) to
systems of historical analysis (pp. 129, 133-34) to considerations of
public policy (pp. 139-40). Despite such shifts, the new interpretive
techniques did not completely displace their predecessors, but instead combined to provide Holmes with a distinctive methodology
(p. 147).
White's examination of Holmes's early scholarship takes on new
meaning by the time the familiar opening paragraph of The Common Law arrives in Chapter Five:
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The
felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories,
intuitions of public policy ... even the prejudices which judges share
with their fellow men, have had a good deal more to po than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be govemed.22

White notes that such memorable rhetoric, rather than Holmes's
detailed exposition of areas of the law, led to the work's critical
acclaim (p. 180). He reveals weaknesses in The Common Law, such
as Holmes's purposive reading of cases,23 inconsistencies with assertions in prior works,24 and varying uses of history. The latter inconsistency is perhaps most evident: Holmes used history to explain
anomalies in legal doctrine25 and to serve as an instrument of policy,26 and at other times he did not draw on history at all.27 Yet
White also emphasizes the originality and monument of Holmes's
task and his success in showing that "legal doctrine is the product of
a complex interaction" between "internal professional and extralegal factors. "28
Ho/mes-Pollock Letters 31 (Mark D. Howe ed., 1941))); see also THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES;
supra note 16, at xx ("lack of generosity toward [his predecessors] ... was one of Holmes's
sins") (emphasis omitted)).
22. P. 149 (quoting OLIVER WENDELL HoLMES, JR., THE CoMMoN LAw 1 (1881)).
23. For instance, Holmes "insist[s]" that an objective theory of contracts predominates in
"the most arguably subjective sphere of the common law - private bilateral contracts created as a result of the subjective preferences of 'free' individuals in a market setting ••.. " P.
178.
24. In reversing a previously-stated position that civil liability was not based on a "culpable state of mind" (p. 121), Holmes "was not loath to use historical research he had earlier
employed for [this] purpose ... to show, antithetically," that one's subjective intentions could
result in liability. P. 157.
25. Some legal rules could "only be understood by reference to the infancy of procedure
among the German tribes, or to the social condition of Rome under the Decemvirs." P. 170
(quoting OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE CoMMON LAW 2).
26. Holmes's lectures on criminal law, torts, and contracts "used history •.. less as a
source of doctrinal anomalies .•• than as support for •.• policy arguments themselves." P.
179.

.

27. "[A]ll [Holmes's] argument in the lecture on criminal law was conducted without any
direct references to history." P. 158.
28. P. 195; see also BAKER, supra note 5, at 257 ("[Holmes's] principal discovery [in The
Common Law], the one that set his book apart from the others and the one that later was to
set Holmes apart from judges of his time .•• was the concept that law .•. was not at all static,
but was evolutionary and responded to the social and· economic environment of which it was
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White extracts various themes that predominate throughout The
Common Law: the emphasis on "experience" rather than "logic"
in the development of legal doctrine; the foundation of doctrine in
substantive - as opposed to formal - values; and the preference
for objective29 and external standards (pp. 180-81). The author
fully discusses these themes in his thorough and meticulous 48-page
tour of The Common Law. He summarizes and critiques the work
in detail (pp. 148-79), explores the contemporaneous reaction to
the work (pp. 182-91), and seeks to locate it in a historical perspective (pp. 191-93).
White does not, however, fully explore the origin of the themes
that permeate The Common Law. Why experience over logic? The
impact of the Civil War springs to mind: Holmes may have seen
"his own convictions crumble when they felt the impact of reality. "30 Or perhaps his membership in the Metaphysical Club - a
small, elitist philosophical society whose members included Charles
Sanders Peirce, the founder of pragmatism31 - laid the foundation for the elevation of experience.32 Why objective, rather than
subjective, standards? Perhaps because in Holmes's world view forged on the battlefield - individuals were insignificant in the
face of the larger enterprise.33 Or perhaps the war experience encouraged Holmes to mete out punishment based on the degree of
danger34 created by an act rather than the actor's subjective
intention.
Another theme running through The Common Law is Holmes's
quest to organize the law. His unification of standards of civil and
criminal liability, for example, was unprecedented. Though White
finds it "striking" (p. 155), he does not uncover Holmes's rationale
a part .•.. "); THE EssENTIAL HoLMES, supra note 16, at xxii ("The functional, evolutionary,
policy-saturated perspective of The Common Law was a considerable innovation in legal
scholarship.").
29. One commentator proclaimed that "[i]f there is a single, overriding, and repetitive
theme running through Holmes's writing, it is the necessity and desirability of establishing
objective rules of law ...." Morton J. Horwitz, The Place of Justice Holmes in American
Legal Thought, in THE LEGACY OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., supra note 3, at 32.
30. HoWE, SHAPING YEARS, supra note 4, at 285.
31. Pragmatism "is that distinctively American philosophical school that requires ideas,
like engines, to be useful, workable, and practical if they are to be believed, if they are to
have merit It relies oh experiment for truth and on action for justification." BAKER, supra
note 5, at 216.
32. Baker asserts that the ''nurtur[ing]" by the others in the group of "so many notions
similar to [Holmes's] own could not but have bolstered [his] confidence in the speculations
he had been advancing ...•" Id.
33. See supra note 8.
34. White illustrates the degree-of-danger factor in describing the criminal law of attempts, which punishes attempted crimes based on the level of danger posed by the defendant's act. P. 160. See, e.g., Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 377 (1913) ("[T]he law is full
of instances where a man's fate depends on his estimating rightly, that is, as the jury subsequently estimates it, some matter of degree.").
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for such an endeavor.3s In the stylistic realm, White situates the
obscurity of the language in The Common Law in its author's attempt to distinguish himself from his father, who utilized the genre
of "popular" language (p. 183). White hypothesizes that "the most
distinctive feature of Holmes as a stylist, his epigrammatic terseness, was consciously or unconsciously adopted as a badge of identity. "36 Yet the author does not carry over such personalprofessional interrelations to the book's substantive realm, leading
the reader to wonder about the effect of Holmes's inner self on the
broad themes of The Common Law.
In Chapter Six - Holmes's "All Round View of the Law" White integrates the subject's Civil War experience into his
speeches and work. In a lecture to Harvard undergraduates in
1886, Holmes exhorted the audience to exercise the "barbaric thirst
for conquest" and to "think great thoughts [by being] heroes as well
as idealists."37 A few months later, he accepted an honorary degree
from Yale University "as an accolade, like the little blow upon the
shoulder from the sword of a master of war ...." 38 White is not
mesmerized by such references. He persuasively notes the distinctions between war and scholarship, and suggests that Holmes's attempt to see himself as an "honorable soldier" may have been a
justification for distinguishing himself, by pursuing scholarship,
from the commercialization and "power-seeking" of his age (p.

215).
White next discusses Holmes's scholarship after The Common
Law, in particular, the 1882 article, "The Path of the Law." This
work mirrored The Common Law in its classification system and
suspicion of logic, but broke new and memorable ground in its increased emphasis on a positivist approach to law, highlighted by the

35. One impetus driving Holmes may have been his scientific methodology. See p. 42.
Another may have been the zeitgeist "Order, uniformity, certainty, and predictability were
the main goals of legal as well as nonlegal writers ofth[e] era." Horwitz, supra note 29, at 39.
36. P. 183. In analyzing the literary foundations for such memorable rhetoric, one commentator has observed that Holmes's language sounds "strong and impressive precisely because [it is] totally unqualified and unconditional"; he only marshals the data that support his
conclusiOn. Mathias W. Reimann, Holmes's Common Law and German Legal Science, in
THE LEGACY OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., supra note 3, at 105. Another has noted
that Holmes's sentences, often "built around the verb 'to be' •.• are definitions, autocratic
edicts or clearly marked statements of firm personal belief intended to distinguish by fiat
what is from what is not." Gibian, supra note 3, at 200-01.
37. P. 211 (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., "The Profession of the Law" (Feb. 17,
1886), in THE OCCASIONAL SPEECHES OF JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 28-30 (Mark
Dewolfe Howe ed., 1962)) [hereinafter OCCASIONAL SPEECHES].
38. P. 214 (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., "On Receiving the Degree of Doctor of
Laws" (June 30, 1886), in OCCASIONAL SPEECHES, supra note 37, at 32).
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"bad man" metaphor39 and the assertion that the law merely equalled "prophecies of what the courts will do in fact."40
Notwithstanding the strength of his scholarship, Holmes
achieved his greatest renown from his opinions as a judge and Justice. After one year as a professor at Harvard Law School, he was
appointed to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts (p. 202).
Although Holmes, upon leaving the court two decades later, would
describe his years on the Supreme Judicial Court as "the twenty
happiest years of my life,''41 he nevertheless encountered frustration when confronted with a caseload composed of "trifling or transitory matters" (p. 255). At times, Holmes sought to apply a
broader view of the law, using the methodologies he had previously
developed. Thus, he limited tort liability (pp. 264-65), applied external theories of criminal conduct (pp. 259-63), utilized an empirical approach in bailment cases (p. 273), and applied an objective
theory of contracts.42 In the few constitutional cases he addressed,
Holmes foreshadowed future Supreme Court opinions by deferring
to the legislature (pp. 280-86). His best-known state court opinions
applied his theory of atomistic competition to the field of labor disputes (pp. 287-89). In his dissent in Vegelahn v. Guntner,43 Holmes
upheld the right of workers to picket, viewing such activity as a
form of competition.44 Plant v. Woods4s followed, and Holmes dissented again, this time upholding union solidarity - in the form of
strikes and boycotts - that interfered with economic relationships
(pp. 289-91). Despite his involvement in such noteworthy cases,
Holmes felt his chances for national recognition slipping away with
the passage of time.
39. Holmes's hypothetical "bad man" acted in accordance with "what the courts could be
expected to let him get away with." P. 219.
40. P. 219 (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., "The Path of the Law," Address Delivered at Boston University School of Law (Jan. 8, 1897), in OUVER WENDELL HOLMES, Cot..
LECTED LEGAL PAPERS 173 (1920)). Richard Posner noted that the "The Path of the Law"
may be "the best article-length work on law ever written." THE EssENTIAL HoLMES, supra
note 16, at x.
41. P. 255 (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., "'I\venty Years in Retrospect," Speech
(Dec. 3, 1902), in OCCASIONAL SPEECHES, supra note 37, at 154).
42. Pp. 273-80. Holmes's across-the-board application of this theory often resulted, as
White points out, in outcomes that "were not what at least one of the 'contracting' parties
wanted." P. 280.
43. 167 Mass. 92, 104 (1896) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (dissenting from Court's decision to
enjoin employees' picketing of employer).
44. Holmes reasoned, according to one commentator, that the picketing workers were
competing with organized capital "for a larger share of the society's wealth. Workers and
employers ... were competitors, and the law ought to be neutral in their struggle." Mark
Tushnet, The Logic of Experience: Oliver Wendell Holmes on the Supreme Judicial Court, 63
VA. L. REv. 975, 1038 (1977).
45. 176 Mass. 492, 504 (1900) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (dissenting from the court's decision to enjoin a union from strong-arming recalcitrant workers in an effort to compel them to
join the union).
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An opportunity to achieve national prominence presented itself
in 1902 with President Theodore Roosevelt's nomination - and
the Senate's confirmation- of Holmes to the U.S. Supreme Court.
A number of fortuitous forces coalesced in Holmes's favor: the
opening up of the "Massachusetts seat" on the Court upon the retirement of Justice Horace Gray; the assassination of former President William McKinley, thus precluding his intended nomination of
Alfred Hemenway, a former law partner of Secretary of the Navy
John Davis Long; and Holmes's personal relationship with both the
new President, Theodore Roosevelt, and the junior Senator from
Massachusetts, Henry Cabot Lodge (pp. 299-303). Holmes immediately recognized this window of opportunity; during a trip to
Roosevelt's private residence prior to the nomination, Holmes "was
waiting on Roosevelt, entertaining [Roosevelt's] children, focusing
all his energies on not letting the nomination slip away" (p. 304).
Once on the Court, Holmes immersed himself in his work, writing opinions at a breakneck pace46 and forgoing the social flirtations and intimacies of his past (pp. 308-11). He rarely interacted
with his fellow Justices, viewing them primarily as hindrances who
inhibited his writing.47 In fact, the only two Justices who Holmes
befriended during the course of his tenure on the Court were Chief
Justice Melville Fuller, who had the power to assign opinions, and
Justice Louis Brandeis, whose intellect Holmes admired and who
taught Holmes the value of dissent (pp. 315-22).
One unifying theme throughout Holmes's early opinions was a
deferential review of state legislation. Although it was his dissent in
Lochner v. New York4 8 that would achieve more lasting fame, an
earlier opinion, Otis v. Parker, 4 9 sounded the same themes of defer- .
ence to majoritarian rule. The Lochner dissent continued the tradition, upholding labor legislation with the now-famous statement
that the Constitution "is not intended to embody a particular economic theory ...."so Yet Holmes was not, as White points out, a
46. White does not explore the possible reasons for Holmes's prolific opinion-writing.
Liva Baker posits two potential rationales: (1) "an unconscious desire to justify his survival
in the war," and (2) "a similar desire to compensate for his childlessness." BAKER, supra
note 5, at 383.
47. Pp. 314-15; see also BAKER, supra note 5, at 441 ("In the rare references Holmes
made to the other justices in his correspondence, he seemed bored with - even, on occasion,
contemptuous of - their emanations, oral and written.").
48. 198 U.S. 45, 74 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
49. 187 U.S. 606 (1902) (discussed at p. 323). In Otis, Holmes spoke for the Court in
upholding a California statute that prohibited "[a]ll contracts for the sales of shares of the
capital stock of any corporation •.. on margin," 187 U.S. at 607, on the ground that courts
cannot invalidate every law judges believe to be "excessive, unsuited to its ostensible end, or
based upon conceptions of morality with which they disagree." 187 U.S. at 608.
50. 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Holmes asserted that a constitution "is made
for people of fundamentally differing views, and the accident of our finding certain opinions
natural and familiar or novel and even shocking ought not to conclude our judgment upon
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fervent liberal or progressive Justice; he upheld legislation not because of its progressive character, but instead because it represented the majoritarian view. Perhaps no field marked Holmes as
less of a progressive than civil rights.51
-· In Giles v. Harris, 52 Holmes wrote for the Court in denying equitable relief for a "political" wrong:53 the Court refused to grant
equitable relief allowing a black citizen of Alabama to register to
vote before the legislature instituted a more restrictive registration
system. Bailey v. Alabama54 presented Holmes with another case
fraught with racial implications. In Bailey, the Justice, in dissent,
supported a presumption that a breach of a contract of servitude
indicated an intent to injure or defraud one's employer (pp. 33637). In methodological contrast, Holmes ignored presumptions in
United States v. Reynolds. 55 In his concurrence in Reynolds,
Holmes concentrated on the empirical consequences of the violations of surety contracts,56 noting that "impulsive people with little
intelligence or foresight may be expected to lay hold of anything
that affords a relief from present pain .... " 57 Holmes's civil rights
opinions thus may be read to reveal a stereotypical attitude that
White locates in the Justice's heritage as an "upper-class Bostonian
... [who] had few opportunities for associations with blacks" (p.
342).
Holmes's unsympathetic stance toward minorities extended beyond the sphere of race (pp. 335-48). In one case, the Justice dethe question whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the United
States." 198 U.S. at76. Holmes alsc> dissented from liberty of contract decisions in Adair v.
United States, 208 U.S. 161, 190 (1908) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (dissenting from Court's deci·
sion to invalidate a statute prohibiting discharge of employees because of union membership)
and Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 26 (1913) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (dissenting from
Court's decision to strike down a statute prohibiting employers from preventing their em·
ployees from joining labor organizations). See pp. 326-29.
51. The paragraphs that follow emphasize Holmes's treatment of minorities in the judi·
cial context.
52. 189 U.S. 475 (1903).
53. P. 334. White astutely notes that such wrongs were of a constitutional - in addition
to political - dimension.
54. 219 U.S. 219 (1911).
55. 235 U.S. 133 (1914).
56. These were agreements in which a surety paid the fine of a convicted person, who, in
tum, worked a certain amount of time for the surety. If the convicted person failed to com·
plete the work, he would be convicted and fined again. Pp. 337-38.
57. P. 338 (quoting from 235 U.S. at 150 (1914) (Holmes, J., concurring)). White, in com·
paring Holmes's views as manifested in these civil rights cases to his earlier pro-abolition
views, persuasively notes that support for abolition did not precisely correlate with promot·
ing equal rights for racial minorities. Although the author observes that Holmes failed to
dissent from his contemporaries' hostile views of minorities, one cited example is unpersuasive: Holmes's rejection of the captaincy of a black regiment during the Civil War (p. 342)
does not provide independent evidence of his views about blacks. This rejection - as White
earlier noted (p. 68) - merely reflected Holmes's loyalty to his regiment.
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ferred to a state governor's determination of whether an
"emergency" existed, and thus whether the governor could jettison
certain constitutional safeguards.ss Holmes also found that authorities could detain anyone entering the United States unless that person exhausted his administrative remedies and affirmatively proved
his American citizenship.59 Even more shocking, the Justice later
ruled that such border detentions, as final administrative decisions,
were unreviewable by courts.60 . In these cases, Holm~s f~ed to distinguish between aliens, to whom the statutes in question were directed, and American citizens, who would also be denied
constitutional protections. A final example of his ultradeferential
review is Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 61 in which Holmes upheld against
an equal protection challenge a state statute that prevented unnaturalized foreign-born residents from "kill[ing] any wild bird or
animal except in defence of person or property."62
Throughout the biography, White emphasizes Holmes's hunger
for recognition, which was still unsated after thirteen years on the
Court (p. 353). Holmes's anonymity would disappear, however,
when a group of progressives - led by then-Harvard Law Professors Felix Frankfurter and Harold Laski - read Holmes's opinions
to conform with their agenda and proselytized the Justice. The
progressives - or "acolytes" - latched onto the Justice's Lochner dissent, his status as a "civilized" (in other words, nonbigoted)
Puritan, and his judicial "realism."63 While Holmes was satisfied
with the long-awaited recognition, a concomitant anxiety crept in,
as he worried that "his reputation might 'fall' or that criticism might
follow praise ..." (p. 371). Such criticism would not come from
Holmes's admirers, who "were more interested in finding consistency than in finding paradox" (p. 390). For example, although
Holmes's acolytes attacked expansive judicial decisionmaking in
58. Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78 (1909) (discussed at p. 335). '
59. United States v. Sing Tuck, 194 U.S. 161 (1904). This proof was exceedingly difficult
because of the lack of universal registration cards and the requirement that a citizen produce
two witnesses attesting to his birth in the United States. P. 344.
60. United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253 (1905) (discussed at pp. 345·46).
61. 232 U.S. 138 (1914). In discussing this case, White persuasively notes the inconsistency between Holmes's deference to "local experience" and his examination of other states'
treatment of the issue. Pp. 347-48.
62. 232 U.S. at 143.
63. Pp. 364-65. In addition to calling attention to the work of Holmes, the acolytes were
"very good to the old fellow and ke[pt] him young." SHELDON M. NOVICK, HONORABLE
JUSTICE: THE LIFE. OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 311 (1989) (quoting letter from Holmes to
Baroness Moncheur (Mar. 10, 1916) (Holmes Papers (on file at Harvard Law School))). In
particular, the acolytes were "intellectually exciting, adventurous; their minds were unfettered, their spirits soared. Fearing perhaps the mental and spiritu~ stagnation that so often
· accompanies old age, [Holmes] prized their youthful qualities more and more as he grew
older." BAKER, supra note 5, at 491. As White notes, they were "buffers against age, links to
prosperity." P. 606.
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the constitutional arena, they ignored such discretion in the sphere
of the common law (p. 380). They failed to note the contradictions
between Holmes's attacks on the concept of a federal common
law64 and application of his own version of such law in, for example,
deciding whether young trespassers should be treated as children or
adults,6s and what steps a driver approaching a railroad crossing
must take to avoid negligence.66
One set of beliefs that the acolytes did not question was
Holmes's views on eugenics, a field more widely accepted at the
time than it is now.67 Indeed, the progressives viewed eugenics as a
social "experiment" to be'embraced (p. 408). Holmes, in particular,
was most enthusiastic about this type of reform - calling it "near
to the first principle of real reform."68 Holmes revealed this enthusiasm to the public with his now-notorious statement in Buck v.
Bell69 that "three generations of imbeciles are enough."70
Even if Holmes was not enthusiastic about social and economic
legislation,71 he deferred to such laws as a Justice. White explains
64. Holmes found a federal common law "illusory" since state common law rules governed nonconstitutional state law disputes. Thus, federal judges "lacked justification for ignoring the states' sovereign dictates and inventing their own rules ...." P. 389.
65. United Zinc Co. v. Britt, 258 U.S. 268 {1922). In Britt, discussed at page 381, two
boys wandered onto private land and died after swimming in a toxic pool. Holmes ignored
the relevant state law, which relied on juries for the determination of status as child or adult,
and held that the boys were adult trespassers, thus precluding recovery by their parents.
66. Baltimore and Ohio R.R. Co. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 {1927) (promulgating a universal rule that drivers approaching railroad crossings must get out of their cars, look, and
listen for a train). White notes that this approach was "absurd," because of the inflexibility of
the rule and because the conduct required by Holmes could be more dangerous than not
stopping at all. P. 385.
67. As White states, "The idea of eugenic reform, to be effectuated through birth control,
family planning, and voluntary or compulsory sterilization, was not thought to be a repressive
one in the early twentieth century. On the contrary, it was associated with a paternalistic
attitude toward the 'lower classes' ...." P. 407. Another commentator confirmed this
observation:
The American public was at the time caught up in a eugenics craze. Since the earliest
years of the twentieth century, lecturers, books by enthusiastic laymen as well as scientists, articles in law journals, newspapers, and magazines had popularized the idea that
selective breeding could vastly improve the composition of the human race.
BAKER, supra note 5, at 600.
68. BAKER, supra note 5, at 603 (quoting letter from Holmes to Harold J. Laski (May 12,
1927) (H91mes Papers (on file at Harvard Law School))).
69. 274 U.S. 200 {1927) (upholding statute providing for the compulsory sterilization of
"mental defectives").
70. 274 U.S. at 207.
71. White fails to explore the roots of Holmes's lack of enthusiasm for reform. One origin may have been ~olmes's father, who "never showed the ardor for reform .•• which other
spokesmen of the Boston tradition felt it to be their obligation and privilege to indulge."
HoWE, SHAPING YEARS, supra note 4, at 24. Another may have been a skepticism that developed at Harvard College and matured through his experience in the Civil War. See Reimann, supra note 36, at 74. Finally, the spirit of the age may have influenced Holmes: "His
scorn of the mob, and perhaps of the very idea of democracy, was a common posture among
nineteenth century Anglo-American legal thinkers." William P. LaPiana, Victorian from
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this deference in discussing Holmes's dissent in Tyson & Brother v.
Banton, 72 in which the Court struck down a state statute that fixed a
maximum price for theater tickets. Holmes possessed the "fatalistic" view, according to White, that no individual could stop the
"force of public opinion" (p. 401 ), and that laws passed by representatives of the majority should thus be upheld. Although White
connects Holmes's "tolerance" of legislative regulation to his "fatalism," he fails to locate the. ori~s of the latter . philosophy in
Holmes's inner self.73 Holmes posited another rationale for deference to state legislatures in noting their role as "social laboratories"74 - a term coined ·by Justice Louis Brandeis. Highlighting
precedent that upheld Congress's regulatory authority, he dissented
from the Court's ruling in Hammer v. Dagenhart15 that Congress
could not regulate "pre-commerce" conditions of child labor under
the Commerce Clause (pp. 393-94). Similarly, he dissented in Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 76 disagreeing with the Adkins majority's
invalidation of a minimum wage law for women. In dissent, he once
again attacked the primacy of liberty of contract and questioned the
assumption that women had achieved equality with men (pp. 39697).
One area in which Holmes did not completely defer to legislatures, and, indeed, the area in which his opinions have achieved the
greatest renown, is free speech. While on the Court, Holmes became increasingly libertarian in this sphere, although his free
speech opinions often emphasized rhetoric over reasoning (pp. 41213). Holmes applied the general law of criminal attempts to his
early First Amendment cases (p. 418). He focused on the actor's
intention to bring about a harm and the tendency of the action to
produce that harm (p. 418). The initial cases in this arena arose in
the context of World War I and the Espionage Act of 1917,77 a statute that aimed to prevent the incitement of insubordination in the
armed forces and the obstruction of recruitment or enlistment of
soldiers (pp. 415, 573 n.14).

Beacon Hill: Oliver Wendell Holmes's Early Legal Sc~olarship, 90

CoLUM. L. REv. 809, 832
(1990).
72. 273 U.S. 418, 445 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
73. Holmes's fatalism may well have stemmed from his experiences in the Civil War,
from which he came to realize the insignificance of the individual. See supra note 8.
74. Pp. 397-99 (discussing Holmes's dissent in Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921),
where the Court struck down a state statute that prohibited injunctions against peaceful picketing in labor disputes).
75. 247 U.S. 251, 277 (1918) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
76. 261 U.S. 525, 567 (1923) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
77. Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat. .217 (1917).
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Schenck v. United States78 was the first free speech case arising
under the Espionage Act to engage Holmes (pp. 415-20). Writing
for the majority in Schenck, the Justice held that Socialist Party officials could be prevented from distributing anticonscription leaflets
to those drafted to serve in World War I. He reasoned that "the
document[s] would not have been sent unless [they] had been intended to have some effect [and that effect would have been] to
influence [those drafted] to obstruct the carrying [out of the
war]." 79 Although Holmes utilized language later canonized "man . . . falsely shouting fire in a theater and causing a panic"8D
and "clear and present danger"81 - such rhetoric, at least as contained in Schenck, merely illustrated the law of criminal attempts.
According to Holmes, the legislature had the power to restrict
speech likely to result in an evil that Congress could prevent. In
two other Espionage Act cases, Holmes extended this prohibition
to obstruction attempts that were less obvious than those presented
in Schenck. In the first, Debs v. United States, 82 the Justice again
spoke for the Court in punishing Eugene Debs, a former Socialist
Party candidate for President, for his remarks against the war and
in support of those who had obstructed the war effort. Although
Debs's remarks, made in the context of a Socialist convention,
could have ultimately led to obstruction, Debs did not actively support this goal, thus distinguishing his case from Schenck. In the second Espionage Act case, Frohwerk v. United States, 83 Holmes again
applied the law of attempts to a case in which the danger of obstruction was attenuated.84
The acolytes were disappointed with Holmes's opinions in the
Espionage Act cases. Laski drew the Justice's attention to a 1919
article in The New Republic by Ernst Freund - a law professor at
the University of Chicago - that seriously criticized the Debs case
(pp. 423-24) and invited Holmes to meet Zechariah Chafee.
Chafee, a young Harvard law professor, urged Holmes to
strengthen his "clear and present danger" test and to distinguish his
First Amendment analysis from the common law of attempts (p.
428). In addition to listening to the acolytes' suggestions, Holm.es
78. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
79. 249 U.S. at 52.
80. 249 U.S. at 52.
81. 249 U.S. at 52.
82. 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
83. 249 U.S. 204 (1919).
84. [Even though i]t [did] not appear that [the obstructors made] any special effort to
reach men who were subject to the draft ••• it [was] imrossible to say that it might not
have been found that the circulation of the [materials was in quarters where a little
breath would be enough to kindle a flame and that the fact was known and relied upon
by those who sent the paper out
249 U.S. at 208-09.

May 1995)

Lives in the Law

1909

personally witnessed the evils of the Red Scare - in the failed attempts to.oust Frankfurter, Laski, and Dean Roscoe Pound from
the Harvard· Law School for their support of labor or status as
Jews.85
Presumably as a result of these developments, Holmes applied a
new free speech methodology in his dissenting opinion in Abrams v.
United States. 8 6 In Abrams, a group of immigrants published and
distributed leaflets advocating a strike among factory workers manufacturing weapons.87. Although this could have more easily led to
obstruction of the war effort than the activities at issue in th~ Espionage Act cases,88 Holmes applied a more substantial "clear and
present danger" test than previously utilized to uphold the free
speech rights of the defendants. The Justice required a stricter intent for obstruction than was previously necessarys9 and stressed a
new rationale for free speech: interaction in the public marketplace
of ideas leads to "truth."9° Dissenting in Abrams, Holmes articulated a First Amendment jurisprudence that accorded distinctive
significance to the freedom of speech, allowing the legislature to
restrict it only if the nation's existence were directly threatened (p.
436).

Although Abrams marked the turning point in Holmes's First
Amendment opinions, his subsequent opinions, as White remarks,
85. See BAKER, supra note 5, at 529-30.
86. 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
87. 250 U.S. at 621.
88. As White persuasively notes,
. .
Schenck had delivered circulars to draftees, but· the circulars had oily spoken abstractly
of the evils of conscription; Frohwerk had not delivered circulars to anyone, and the
pamphlets he printed were not directed specifi~y at draftees; Debs had not said anything specific about draft resistance to World War I. The defendants in Abrams had
printed leaflets and thrown them out the window of a factory, knowing they might be
'received by munitions workers, whose factory was in the vicinity.
P. 431 {footnotes omitted).
89. He required the aim to obstruct to be the "proximate motive" of the act 250 U.S. at
627 (Holmes, J., dissenting), discussed at. p. 43;'..
90. 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[T]he best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market •..."). White posits two
sources for such a test: Holmes's cultural determinism and Chafee's notion that a free trade
in ideas leads to truth. P. 435. Yet he does not explore two other factors. First, Holmes's
war experience may have provided the seeds for the marketplace metaphor. As in war,
power often determined victory in the marketplace of ideas. Holmes once defined truth as
"the majority vote of that nation that can lick all others." P. 435 (quoting letter from Holmes
to Judge Learned Hand (June 24, 1918) (Holmes Papers (on file at Harvard Law School))).
Generally, Holmes saw "free speech as itself a fighting faith - based on a verbal model of
battle." Gibian, supra note 3, at 212. A second origin may have been the influence of
Holmes's father, who warned that "fear of open discussion implies feebleness of inward conviction and [that) great sensitiveness to the expression of individual opinion is a mark of
weakness." BAKER, supra note 5, at 538 (quoting 2 THE W9RKS OF OLIVER WENDELL
HoLMES, SR. 109 {1892)). Holmes himself demonstrates adoption of this view in his "personal belief that the Espionage Act prosecutions should not have been brought" and in
"prid[ing] himself on not being 'hysterical' with respect to unpopular speech." P. 429.
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do not systematically develop its rationale (p. 437). Holmes dissented from cases in which the Court invalidated legislation that
prohibited the teaching of foreign languages in public schools.91 In
these cases, Holmes applied a lenient means-ends determination less than the heightened scrutiny of Abrams - to uphold the
restrictive statutes (p. 440). Holmes appeared to move beyond the
clear and present danger test in his dissent in United States v.
Schwimmer, 92 in which he advanced yet another rationale for free
speech: primacy for the "freedom for the thought we hate. "93 Finally, White points out that Holmes's rhetorical flourishes, such as
the assertion in Gitlow v. New YorkP 4 that "[e]very idea is an incitement,"95 provide a "distinctive literary style" more than "a new
Frrst Amendment jurisprudence" (p. 445).
In the chapter's conclusion, White details Holmes's inconsistent
justifications for free speech, from Schwimmer's countermajoritarian "freedom for the thought we hate" to Abrams's majoritarian
marketplace of ideas. The author also notes Holmes's failure to
apply consistently the "clear and present danger" test articulated in
Abrams, suggesting that Holmes "did not intend it as a doctrinal
guideline at all ... [but rather as] an attempt to create an appearance of consistency" with the earlier Schenck version of the test (p.
451). White captures one of Holmes's major goals as a judge:
"Holmes often treated judging as a kind of game, an exercise in
which he tried to find 'a form of words' to justify a result ...."96
Yet White's analysis of Holmes's First Amendment jurisprudence
leaves the reader with some lingering questions. Did Holmes issue
unconditional e~cts to distance himself from the endless questions
of his father?97 Did the Justice aim to recall the spirit of war in
lofty and memorable language?9B Regardless of the reason for
Holmes's style, White effectively conveys to the reader an impor91. Pp. 438-41 (discussing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) and Bartels v. Iowa,
262 U.S. 404 (1923)). According to White, these foreign language cases "made Holmes focus
on protecting speech as a component of liberty, rather than focusing on a democracy's reliance upon speech in the search for truth." P. 440.
92. 279 U.S. 644, 653 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (dissenting from Court's decision to
deny naturalization to a Hungarian pacifist who admitted in her application that she was not
"willing to take up arms in defense of this country").
93. 279 U.S. at 654-55, quoted at p. 447.
94. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
95. 268 U.S. at 673 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (dissenting from Court's decision to uphold
statute outlawing advocacy of the overthrow of government), quoted at p. 444.
96. P. 452. For a discussion of Holmes's rhetoric, see supra note 36.
97. See supra note 9.
98. One potential influence White does not discuss is James Fitzjames Stephen, an English scholar and judge, who possessed a "marvelously direct, muscular, vivid, witty, vivacious,
economical style of writing" and a "moral hardness" that his friend Holmes may have
adopted. JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, LIBERTY, EQUALITY, FRATERNITY AND THREE BRIEF
EssAYS 9-10 (foreword by Richard A. Posner) (1991).
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tant point: that Holmes, although doctrinally inconsistent, supplied
philosophical justifications for free speech that remain influential
today (p. 453).
After exploring the nuances of Holmes's Supreme Court opinions, White turns to the Justice's aging process in Chapter Thirteen.
He notes that the process was "long, slow, and on the whole satisfactory," and that, in fact, his last decade on the Court may have
been his most satisfying (p. 455). Holmes did not have significant
health problems (pp. 455-56), and his last years bore witness to a
variety of honors and achievements, climaxing in a nationwide radio address on his ninetieth birthday (pp. 462-65). Yet age would
eventually catch up with the Justice, and in January 1932, with some
prodding from Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, Holmes retired
from the Court (pp. 466-67). For the first time in his life, "there
was suddenly no central purpose, nothing to conserve his energies
for and to concentrate his powers on" (p. 475). Three years later,
two days shy of his ninety-fourth birthday, Holmes died.
White ends his biography with "A Concluding Assessment."
The author expertly traces Holmes's significant characteristics in particular, his ambition, passion, and interaction between "self"
and "other" 99 - through his professional (pp. 476-79) and personal
(pp. 482-84) lives. White also summarizes Holmes's scholarship
and opinions, highlighting the Justice's rhetoric and his ambitious,
unconventional methodological goals (pp. 480-81). Finally, the author justifies his own project by noting Holmes's status as "a figure
of great significance" (p. 486). White suggests that the root of
Holmes's mystique lies in his position as both "a figure of popular
romance" and an extremely influential icon in American legal history (pp. 486-88).

* * *

G.E. White's work is the most thorough biography ever written
about Holmes.100 It is remarkable in its depth and readability. In
focusing upon the relationship between his subject's personal and
professional lives, White has tackled his project on perhaps its
deepest and most rewarding level. Throughout his tour of Holmes's
life and work, the author constantly points out and cross-references
99. White explores the self-other interaction most notably in contrasting Holmes's quest
for power, in his "efforts to impose [his] will on [his] appointed tasks," with his powerlessness, in his belief "that the contributions of any individual would be dwarfed in the universe."
P. 479.
100. Mark DeWolfe Howe, Holmes's official biographer, died after completing the first
two volumes of his biography - taking the reader through The Common Law. See HoWE,
SHAPING YEARS, supra note 4, and HoWE, PROVING YEARS, supra note 15. 1\vo recent single-volume biographies, written by Liva Baker, see supra note 5, and Sheldon Novick, see
supra note 63, lack the analysis of Holmes's legal scholarship and judicial opinions that White
provides.
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distinctive characteristics of his subject. In his final chapter, for example, White traces Holmes's ambition from his early years to his
quest for national recognition, and explores his subject's "zest ...
for life" (p. 478). One superb example of White's success in this
sphere is his analysis of Holmes's literary style.
In exploring the gold mines of Holmes's rhetoric, White methodically pursues his project, and is not mesmerized by the glittering aphorisms penned by his subject. The author frequently
notes potential origins of Holmes's rhetoric: a reaction to his father
- who wrote in the genre of popular prose - and a literary heritage and inclination. White conducts his analysis of Holmes's opinions and writings on several levels, never sacrificing examinations of
style or reasoning. Throughout the biography, the author parses
Holmes's opinions and writings in extraordinary detail, examining
his language meticulously and noting analytical gaps that the Justice's rhetoric often obscures. White effectively paints the picture
of a Justice more interested in "stylj.stic elegance and pithiness"
than "technical legal analysis and exegesis" (p. 410).
The author~s exposition of Holmes's style is impeccable, in part
because he located its genesis in Holmes's inner self. White draws
on Holmes's inner self as a background to professional decisions,
such as immersing himself in scholarship, joining the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court, positioning himself for a seat on the U.S.
Supreme Court, and seeking recognition through his association
with the acolytes.
Unfortunately, White does not integrate Holmes's personal life
with the broad themes - such as judicial deference and a preference for objective standards - he espoused in his professional capacity. Holmes's Civil War experience serves as an example of this
omission. White magnificently traces Holmes's post hoc reaction to
the Civil War, revealing his subject's honorable and majestic recollection of the war, but he does not continue the analysis on the
deeper level of the broad themes running through Holmes's judicial
opinions and writings. For example, White does not treat the Civil
War as a formative intellectual experience, sowing the seeds, perhaps, of Holmes's preference for experience over logic or hi~ preference for objective rather than subjective standards. Nor does
White emphasize the wartime roots of Holmes's belief in the insignificance of the individual. This belief, which is central to Holmes's
persona, may have had a substantial impact on theories he brought
to the bench, such as a deferential review of legislation. Although
White adequately describes Holmes's reaction to the Civil War, this
examination fails to extend through Holmes's judicial work.
To state that White could have explored further interactions between Holmes's personal and professional lives is not to diminish
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what the author has accomplished. Indeed, in endeavoring to map
a :figure's profound personal characteristics to his lifetime of
achievement, one cannot possibly examine every conceivable interaction. White's achievement is that he started down this worthwhile path. With a thoroughness essential to his task and with an
organization and creativity that ensure this work a place in the pantheon of great biographies, G.E. White has written a book that
promises to be accessible and rewaromg to all.
-

Michael A. Carrier

